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Abstract
This paper produces a comprehensive theory of the value of Bayesian information
and its static demand. Our key insight is to assume `natural units' corresponding to
the sample size of conditionally i.i.d. signals | focusing on the smooth nearby model
of the precision of an observation of a Brownian motion with uncertain drift. In a two
state world, this produces the heat equation from physics, and leads to a tractable
theory. We derive explicit formulas that harmonize the known small and large sample
properties of information, and reveal some fundamental properties of demand:
² Value `non-concavity': The marginal value of information is initially zero.
² The marginal value is convex/rising, concave/peaking, then convex/falling.
² `Lumpiness': As prices rise, demand suddenly suddenly chokes o® (drops to 0)
² The minimum information costs on average exceed 2.5% of the payo® stakes
² Information demand is hill-shaped in beliefs, highest when most uncertain
² Information demand is initially elastic at interior beliefs
² Demand elasticity is globally falling in price, and approaches 0 as prices vanish.
² The marginal value vanishes exponentially fast in price, yielding log demand.
Our results are exact for the Brownian case, and approximately true for weak
discrete informative signals. We prove this with a new Bayesian approximation result.
¤We acknowledge useful suggestions of Paavo Salminen and Xu Meng, and the comments from the
theory seminar at the University of Toronto and Georgetown University. Lones thanks the NSF for
¯nancial support.
11 Introduction
Information acquisition is an irreversible process. One cannot return to the pristine state
of ignorance once apprised any given fact. Heat dissipation also obeys the arrow of time:
The heat equation in physics describing its transition is not time symmetric. This paper
begins with an observation that this link is not merely philosophical. In static models
of Bayesian information acquisition, the value function of beliefs and the quantity of
information acquired obeys an inhomogeneous form of the heat equation. We show that a
nonlinear transformation of the value function and beliefs exactly obeys the heat equation.
This paper exploits this and a parallel insight and crafts the ¯rst global theory of the value
of information and its demand. For a binary state world, we derive explicit formulas that
provide the bigger picture on the famous nonconcavity of information, and the unique
demand curve that it induces: We characterize the \choke-o® demand" level, and also
make many novel ¯ndings | eg., demand elasticity is monotonically falling to zero.
Information is an important good, and lies at the heart of most innovative research in
decision-making, game theory, and general equilibrium analysis. Yet information is also
a poorly understood good. This ¯rst of all owes to a lack of natural units. Blackwell's
Theorem only considers one signal, for instance. We thus start by measuring information
in its `natural units' corresponding to signal sample sizes, or equivalently, the precision of
a normally distributed signal. This is the foundation of our entire theory.
Our ¯rst insight is really a technical one that opens the door to our theory. We pro-
duce in Lemmas 1{4 a transformation jointly of time and beliefs yielding a detrended log
likelihood ratio process. This process is the unique one sharing two critical characteristics:
First, it has unit di®usion coe±cient (variance). Second | and much more subtly | it
allows us to change measure to produce a Wiener process without adding a new stochastic
process. This immediately delivers to us in Lemma 5 a simple transition law for beliefs.
This density has the key property that it is proportional to its time derivatives (Lemma 6).
Underlying everything is the standard _-shaped payo® function of the belief in the
high state: A decision maker takes the low action left of a cross-over belief, and the high
action right of it. It so turns out that the ex post value of information is a multiple of the










Figure 1: Marginal Value of Information.
surprising that our analysis traces the two routes used to price options: the heat equation
approach of Black and Scholes (1973) and the martingale measure tack of Harrison and
Kreps (1979). Yet the belief process is less tractable than the geometric Brownian motion
assumed for asset prices, and our transformation therefore more complex.
Using the original belief process, the payo® function of beliefs and information demand
obeys an inhomogeneous heat equation (Lemma 7). In our critical innovation, we per-
form both a change of variables, blending time and log-likelihood ratios, and a nonlinear
transformation of payo®s to produce the standard heat equation. We then exploit the
solution of the heat equation, and then in Lemma 8 via martingale methods. Either way,
Theorem 1 explicitly expresses the value of information in terms of the normal distribution.
We then turn to our substantive ¯ndings. Theorem 2 expresses the marginal value
of information in terms of the derivatives of the transition belief density. This reduces
analysis of the value derivative to a polynomial in the reciprocal demand. Using this,
Corollary 1 ¯nds that the marginal value is initially zero | the nonconcavity | as found
in Radner-Stiglitz (1984) [RS], and rigorously formalized in Chade-Schlee (2002) [CS]. The
su±cient conditions in CS for this result do not encompass our model. By Theorem 3,
the marginal value convexly rises, is then concave and hill-shaped, and ¯nally convex and
falling | as in Figure 1. We compute demand at the peak marginal value of information.
So with linear prices, information demand vanishes at high prices, before jumping to
a positive level (Theorem 4) strictly below the peak marginal value. The Law of Demand
then kicks in, and the demand schedule thereafter coincides with the marginal value sched-
ule. One never buys just a little information. Theorem 5 quanti¯es the nonconcavity,
determining the minimal purchase on average to be 2.5% of the expected payo® stakes.
In Theorem 6, we ¯nd that information demand is hill-shaped in beliefs, unlike the
2dynamic model with impatience of Moscarini and Smith (2001) [MS1]. Furthermore,
it jumps down to 0 near beliefs 0 and 1, when the choke-o® demand binds. Here we
discover an interesting contrast with sequential learning models, because our thresholds
owe to global optimality considerations. Completing this picture, Theorem 7 ¯nds that
information demand is hill-shaped in beliefs (quasi-concave, precisely) | opposite to MS1.
A novel topic we explore is the demand elasticity. Theorem 8 asserts that information
demand is initially elastic at interior beliefs; the elasticity is globally falling in price, and
is vanishing in the price. This analysis exploits all of our analytic structure.
We ¯nally revisit in Theorem 9 the large demand analysis of Moscarini and Smith
(2002) [MS2] now quickly via our explicit formulas rather than large deviation theory.
MS2 also measure information by sample size, but assumed cheap discrete information, and
not our continuous or weak discrete signals. The marginal value of information eventually
vanishes exponentially fast, producing the logarithmic demand of MS2 at small prices.
We sharpen the demand approximation, and ¯nd that it is monotonically approached.
Our Gaussian information is generated by the time that one observes a Brownian
motion with state-dependent drift, but state-independent di®usion coe±cient. Consider
a discrete model where the decision-maker chooses how many conditional iid signals to
draw. Theorem 10 shows that Bayes' updating weakly approaches the continuous time
Brownian ¯lter as the signal strength vanishes, and quantity is rescaled downwards. We
show that garbled signals have precisely this property. We next apply the Theorem of
the Maximum, ¯nding in Theorem 11 that the demand formulas and value of information
approximate the discrete formulas for small bits of information (weak signals).
The experimentation literature aside, we know of one related information demand
paper. In Kihlstrom (1974), a consumer faces a linear price for precision of a Gaussian
signal given a (conjugate) Gaussian prior. For a speci¯c hyperbolic utility function, he
can write utility as a function of signals and avoid computing the density of posteriors.
We next lay out and develop the model, and very rapidly progress through the results
on beliefs, the value and marginal value of information, demand, and weak discrete signals.
32 The Model
A. The Decision Problem. Assume a one-shot decision model, where a decision maker
(DM) chooses how much information to buy, and then acts. For simplicity, we assume
two actions A;B, whose payo®s ¼µ
A;¼µ
B depend on the state µ = L;H. Action B is best




B ¸ 0.1 Since the
DM has prior beliefs q 2 (0;1), the convex _-shaped expected payo® function is
u(q) = maxhq¼H
A + (1 ¡ q)¼L
A;q¼H
B + (1 ¡ q)¼L
Bi ´ maxh¼L
A + mq;¼L
B + Mqi (1)
thereby de¯ning M = ¼H
A ¡ ¼L
A and m = ¼H
B ¡ ¼L
B. We assume no dominated actions, so
that payo®s have a kink at a cross-over belief ^ q = (¼L
A ¡ ¼L
B)=(M ¡ m) 2 (0;1).




B) = M ¡m > 0.
The DM never incurs a payo® loss greater than M¡m from making a wrong action choice;
this bound is tight when either di®erence (¼H
B ¡ ¼H
A) ¸ 0 or (¼L
A ¡ ¼L
B) ¸ 0 vanishes.
B. The Standard Information Acquisition Model. Given is a probability space
(­;F;P), were ­ is a set, F a ¾-algebra of subsets of ­, and P a probability measure
on F. This space captures all uncertainty, including the state of the world µ = L;H.
Before making a decision, the DM can obtain information of any level t ¸ 0 about
the state µ. While more information could plausibly connote better quality information,
we speci¯cally mean that the DM with information level t2 knows strictly more about
the state of the world than does the DM with information level t1 · t2. So assume a
¯ltration fFt : t 2 [0;1)g, so that the ¾-algebras are nested Ft1 ½ Ft2 µ F when t1 < t2.
The DM observes Ft, updates her beliefs to q(t) = P(HjFt) from the prior q(0) = q.
The ex ante expected payo® (prior to seeing Ft) is u(t;q) = E[u(q(t))jq(0) = q], and
the value of information is v(t;q) = u(t;q) ¡ u(q) | namely, the expected increase in
utility from observing Ft. Faced with a constant marginal cost c > 0 of information, the
DM can choose the observation `time' t (namely, the demand level) at cost ct. The net
payo® given the level t is v(t;q)¡ct. This is maximized by choosing the information level
¿(c;q) > 0, which is our demand schedule. Finally, the DM chooses the best action.
1Further, it is without loss of generality to assume for simplicity that ¼
H
A = 0, since the decision must
be made. An analogous choice of ¼
H
B = 1 is not allowed later on, without also scaling the cost function.
4C. The Natural Continuous Units of Information. We actually have a speci¯c
¯ltration in mind. Let the DM observe the time-t realization of a process X(¢) with drift
§¹ in states H;L, respectively, and constant di®usion coe±cient ¾ > 0. Thus, the signal
is twice as informative when t doubles | just as is true for the sample size of conditionally
iid signals. We show in Section 7 that this approximates discrete bit sampling models.
By Theorem 9.1 in Liptser and Shirayev (2001), when observing the realizations of
the Brownian Motion X(t) in continuous time, the belief ~ q(t) = P(HjFt) obeys the Bayes
¯lter d~ q(t) = ³~ q(t)(1 ¡ ~ q(t))dW(t), where ³ ´ 2¹=¾ is the signal/noise ratio, and W(¢) is
a standard Wiener process w.r.t. the measure P (i.e. unconditional on µ = H;L). Notice
that if we de¯ne q(t) = ~ q(t=³2), then2 (dq(t))2 = (d~ q(t))2=³2 = q(t)2(1¡q(t))2dt, and thus
dq(t) = q(t)(1 ¡ q(t))dW(t): (2)
We henceforth set ³ = 1 and compute the time (demand) ^ t with any ^ ³ > 0 from ^ t = t=^ ³2.
3 Beliefs and Log Likelihood Ratios
We begin by describing the limit behavior of beliefs q(¢).
Lemma 1 (Long Run Beliefs) The belief process in (2) satis¯es













= 1 ¡ q:
So the probability that q(t) = 2 (0;1) in ¯nite time is zero and q(1) = 0 or 1.
The proof of (a) is in the appendix: q(¢) avoids the boundary as the di®usion coe±cient
in (2) vanishes quickly near q(¢) = 0;1. Part (b) owes to the martingale property.
Our objective is to derive from posterior beliefs a tractable process that contains the
same information. In particular, we aim for a simple standard Wiener process. First, in
Lemma 2, we ¯nd a monotone transformation of posterior beliefs which has a unit di®usion
coe±cient (variance); it turns out that this is unique. Second, in Lemma 4, we change
2To justify the ¯rst inequality, E[W
2(t=³
2)] = t=³




5probability measure so that this transformation retains the martingale property. There is
a degree of freedom here, which we resolve in Lemma 3 on grounds of tractability.
Lemma 2 (Likelihood Ratios) Let z(t) = ¸(t;q(t)), where ¸ 2 C2. If the di®usion





, where jA(t)j < 1 for all t.





dt + ¸qq(t)(1 ¡ q(t))dW: (3)






This lemma is intuitive, since Bayes rule is multiplicative in likelihood ratios, and







dt + dW(t) ´ º(t)dt + dW(t); (4)
where we have implicitly de¯ned º(t). Next, de¯ne the probability measure Q on (­;Ft)
by the Radon-Nikodym derivative:
dQ
dP













Lemma 3 (Radon-Nikodym Derivative) R(t) = q(t)=q i® A(t) = ¡t=2.
This result is important as it does not introduce a new stochastic process. With a di®erent
R-N derivative, we would have two imperfectly correlated stochastic processes q(¢) and
R(¢), and derivation of our results would become exceedingly di±cult. A unique change
of measure maintains the uni-dimensionality of the stochastic process.






and guessing q(t) = qeY (t) correctly yields, using Ito's Lemma, dq(t) = q(t)dY (t) +
1
2q(t)(dY (t))2 = q(t)(1 ¡ q(t))dW(t) | namely, our belief ¯lter (2). In other words,










So motivated, if we set º(s) = q(s) ¡ 1 in (5), then we get Lemma 3.
6Equation (4) implies that A(t) = ¡t=2, which we henceforth assume. Thus,













Observe that z(¢) is a partially de-trended log-likelihood ratio (logLR). While the
logLR of state L to state H is well-known to be a martingale conditional on state H, this
is not useful because we do not know state H. We instead ¯rst subtract the deterministic
portion of the drift from the logLR, and then change measure from P to the conditional
measure Q given q(t). This yields a martingale such that the R-N derivative of Q is q(t)=q.





(q(s) ¡ 1)ds + W(t)
is a Wiener process under the probability measure Q. Hence, z(¢) is a Q-martingale and

















for all (t;z;y) 2 (0;1) £ R2, where Á(y) = 1 p
2¼e¡
y2
2 is the standard normal pdf.
Equation (6) follows from the facts that (4) can be written as dz(t) = d ^ W(t) and ^ W(¢) is
a Q-Wiener process by Girsanov's theorem (see e.g. Âksendal (1998, pp. 155{6)).
We now derive the belief transition pdf »(t;q;r) = @
@rP(q(t) · rjq(0) = q), using the
above normal transition pdf for transformed log-likelihood ratios z(t) (see Figure 2).




























Figure 2: Transition Probability Function. We plot the symmetric pdf »(t;q;r) for transitions
from q = 0:5 to any belief r after an elapse time t = 1.















































































The paper hereafter repeatedly exploits this belief transition pdf to derive the formula
for the value and marginal value of information, as well as the properties of the demand
function. In particular, this yields a critical time derivative:














4 The Value of Information
4.1 Option Pricing Analogy
Before deriving our value function, it helps to motivate this with a related exercise done
in ¯nance. To this end, simplify matters by positing that action A is a safe action yielding
3We write Eq[¢] = E[¢jq(0) = q] and Ez[¢] = E[¢jz(0) = z].
8zero payo®, so that ¼H
A = ¼L
A = 0. Equation (1) can then be written as follows
u(q) = M maxh0;q ¡ ^ qi:
Here we get immediately the following interpretation for u(q)=M: It equals the payo® of
a European call option with strike price ^ q and underlying asset price q.
Black and Scholes (1973) derive the option pricing formula when the underlying as-
set follows a geometric Brownian motion. They use an arbitrage argument to deduce a
parabolic PDE that reduces to the heat equation after a change of variable. In this trans-
formation, time is understood as time to maturity. But geometric Brownian motion is still
far more tractable than our nonlinear belief di®usion (2), and thus only a time rescaling
of the range variable is needed. By contrast, we use a more complicated transformation.
Harrison and Kreps (1979) and Harrison and Pliska (1981) later derived the option
pricing formula using martingale methods. In our paper, the z-process is a martingale
under the measure Q just as the discounted asset price is a martingale under the `pricing
measure' in Harrison and Kreps (1979). Our ¯rst approach follows this line of thought,
but again, its execution requires a simultaneous range and domain transformation.
4.2 Value Function Derivation
Applying the backward equation to u(t;q) = Eq[u(q(t))] for the driftless belief di®usion
process q(¢) in (2) yields our key insight into payo®s:4




q2(1 ¡ q)2uqq(t;q) (8)
for all (t;q) 2 (0;1) £ (0;1) with the initial condition: u(0;q) = u(q).
Notice that (8) implies that the marginal value of information is positive (ut(t;q) ¸ 0)
i® the value of information is convex in beliefs (uqq(t;q) ¸ 0). This further motivates
the link to the heat equation, as the temperature gradient within a ¯nite bar obeys a
4In fact, all time derivatives utn in Theorem 2 satisfy the inhomogeneous heat equation { an curious
truth that we do not exploit.
9qualitatively similar law where convexity is critical, as Figure 3 depicts. By the same
token, the option value is convex in price, just as expected payo®s are convex in beliefs.
u
q
Figure 3: Analogy with Fourier's Law. This illustrates Fourier's Law of Heat Conduction
| in particular, how the heat °ow is locally positive exactly when the heat distribution is locally convex
on the bar. Speci¯cally, if u(t;q) is the temperature at position q on a bar, with ends held constant at
temperatures u(0) and u(1) respectively, then the temperature is increasing ut > 0 i® uqq > 0. This is
exactly analogous to the behavior of expected payo®s as we acquire more information.





























Proof 1: The Martingale Method. We ¯rst follow the approach of Harrison and






























using Lemma 4. Now u(t;q) = qh(t;¸(0;q)) gives (9).
Proof 2: The Heat Equation. We now adapt the approach of Black and Scholes
(1973). Change the variables in (8) from beliefs q to Z = log[q=(1 ¡ q)] + t=2 = ¸(¡t;q)








. Then the heat equation obtains:5 Ht(t;Z) = 1
2HZZ(t;Z).


































































We thank Robert Israel of UBC for ¯rst pointing out a related transformation.





















Finally, using H(t;Z + t=2) = h(t;Z) gives the representation (9). ¤
We now exploit the above stochastic representation to derive the value of information.
It follows from Lemma 1 that the long-run limit of the expected payo® is given by
lim
t"1
u(t;q) = qu(1) + (1 ¡ q)u(0) ´ ¹ u(q); (10)
i.e., we can write u(1;q) = ¹ u(q). Let us de¯ne the full information gap as follows
FIG(t;q) = u(1;q) ¡ u(t;q) = ¹ u(q) ¡ u(t;q): (11)
Thus, FIG is the di®erence between the expected payo®s with full information and time t
information. We now explore the behavior of the value function v(t;q) for ¯nite t > 0.
Theorem 1 (Value Formula) The expected payo® is u(t;q) = q¼H
B+(1¡q)¼L
A¡FIG(q;t),


























t ¡ 1 p
tL(^ q;q)
´
where ©(¢) is the standard normal cdf. The value of information v(t;q) = u(t;q)¡u(q) is
v(t;q) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > <


























t ¡ 1 p
tL(^ q;q)
´


























t + 1 p
tL(^ q;q)
´
8 q ¸ ^ q:
(12)
The appendix proof uses the fact that in Lemma 8, e¡t=2¡z(t) is log-normally distributed.
Figure 4 illustrates the posterior expected payo® with di®erent information levels.
From Figure 4, we see that the value of information v(t;q) is high when q is close to
the cross-over belief ^ q, and is low when q is close to 0 or 1.
11ˆ q q
v
Figure 4: Posterior expected payo® with di®erent information levels. The parameter
values are: ^ q = 0:48, ¼
A
H = 1, ¼
A
L = 2, ¼
B
H = 2:1, and ¼
B
L = 1. The bottom solid line graphs ¹ u(q), while
the top dotted line is u(q). Between we ¯nd u(1;q);u(5;q);u(15;q), respectively the graphs |, { ¢,--
The results in our setting are analogous to the properties of call options. The value
of information in our setting is like the time value of the option. Informational value is
increasing in t just as the time value of the option is increasing in the time to maturity.
5 The Marginal Value of Information
Loosely, information only has positive marginal value if we hit the cross-over belief ^ q at
time t; its value is then increasing in the payo® slope di®erence M ¡m and belief variance
^ q2(1¡^ q)2. Since v(t;q) = u(t;q)¡u(q), the time derivatives of the value of information and
expected payo®s coincide, vtn(t;q) = utn(t;q), for all n = 1;2;:::. All these derivatives
admit a similar expression, as we now see:









»(t;q; ^ q) (13)




B ´ M. In particular, the
marginal value of information is given by a scaled standard normal density:
vt(t;q) =

















Theorem 2 is proven in the appendix by just di®erentiating Theorem 1. We now give an
incomplete but suggestive development of the marginal value of information in terms of the
12derivative of the belief transition density. Since the backward equation ut = 1
2q2(1¡q)2uqq
holds at any time " > 0, and since u(t;q) = Eq[u(0;q(t))] ¼ Eq[u(";q(t))],








where we approximate uqq near the kink with uqq(";q) ¼ M¡m
2" for all q 2 (^ q ¡ "; ^ q + "),
and otherwise uqq(";q) = 0. Taking the limit " ! 0, we get uqq(0; ^ q) = 1 and otherwise
uqq(0;q) = 0. Thus, ut(t;q) ¼ 1
2(M ¡ m)^ q2(1 ¡ ^ q)2»(t;q; ^ q).
Comparing the marginal value schedule to the likewise left-skew log-normal density,
the tail of vt is asymptotically much thinner. Further notice that while the value of
information behaves continuously as beliefs q converge upon the cross-over belief ^ q, the
marginal value explodes for small t. This discontinuity is re°ected in the next result.
Corollary 1 (Derivatives) The marginal value of information obeys6
(a) For all t 2 (0;1), vt(t;q) 2 (0;1) for all q 2 (0;1), while vt(1;q) = 0 for all q
(b) [Radner-Stiglitz (1984)] vt(0+;q) = 0 for all q 6= ^ q, while vt(0+; ^ q) = 1
(c) [and beyond...] Finally, vtn(0+;q) = 0 for all q and n = 2;3;:::.
The proof is in the appendix. Part (b) is the `nonconcavity in the value of information'
conclusion of RS and CS, since a marginal value that starts at zero cannot globally fall.
(See Figure 5.) We go somewhat beyond this conclusion in part (c), ¯nding that all higher
order derivatives also initially vanish for our informational framework.
Note that the Inada condition of RS or of CS (their assumption A1) simply does not
apply.7 As natural as our Gaussian model is | it is the limit of the discrete sampling
models, as we see in x8 | it escapes known su±cient conditions. And yet vt(0+;q) = 0.
We now globally describe the marginal value of information. To this end, let us de¯ne
an in°ection point in the value of information, where the marginal value peaks:
TFL(q) = 2
hp
1 + L2(^ q;q) ¡ 1
i
: (15)
6As usual, vt(0+;q) = lims#0 vt(s;q), and vtn(0+;q) = lims#0 vtn(s;q).
7In our case, the signal X has mean ¹µt and variance t. The RS Inada condition fails, and assumption
A1 in CS fails, because the signal density derivative in t explodes at t = 0 | as CS acknowledge for
Kihlstrom (1974). But the critical di®erence is not the signal distribution, as CS suggest: Had we assumed
the convex continuous action model of Kihlstrom, there would be no easily deduceable nonconcavity:








2uqq(q) > 0 by assumption.
13We remark that this in°ection point demand is surprisingly independent of the payo®
levels except insofar as it a®ects the cross-over belief ^ q. This holds in spite of the fact that
the marginal value of information (14) is indeed increasing in the payo® stakes M ¡ m.
Theorem 3 (Value and Marginal Value of Information) Fix q 2 (0;1) with q 6= ^ q.
(a) The value of information is initially convex until t = TFL(q), after which it is concave.
(b) The marginal value is rising until TFL(q), and later falling. It is convex in [0;T1(q)],








Figure 5: Value and Marginal Value of Information. At left (right) is the graph of the
value (marginal value) of information for the parameter values ^ q = 0:5, ¼
A
H = 1, ¼
A
L = 2, ¼
B
H = 2, and
¼
B
L = 1. The solid lines are the values with q = 0:2 or q = 0:8, while the dotted lines with the cross-over
belief q = 0:5. Observe that the nonconcavity arises when we do not start at the cross-over belief.
Proof: First note that from (15) we get that TFL(q) 2 [0;1) and that TFL(q) = 0 if and













where vt(t;q) > 0, according to Corollary 1. Now vtt(t;q) = 0 gives ¨(t;q) ´ t2 + 4t ¡
4L2(^ q;q) = 0, which yields (15). Part (a) owes to ¨(s;q) 7 0 for all s ? TFL(q).



















and hence vttt(t;q) = 0 if t4 + 8t3 + (48 ¡ 8L2)t2 ¡ 96L2t + 16L2 = 0. Clearly, vttt > 0





Figure 6: Consequences of the Information Non-concavity. The choke-o® demand
TCH(q) exceeds the peak marginal value demand TFL(q) due to the non-concavity of information. Thus,
the demand curve for information is not simply the falling portion of the marginal value of information.
Since vttt(t;q) > 0 for large t, if there exists a strictly positive root then there must be two
strictly positive roots T1(q) and T2(q). If there are no positive roots then vttt(t;q) > 0 for
all t > 0. Along with (c) in Corollary 1, this gives vtt(t;q) > 0 for all t > 0 | contradicting
part (a) of this Lemma. So there are two positive roots. We have T1(q) < TFL < T2(q)
since vtt(TFL;q) = 0 and vtt(t;q) > 0 for all t < TFL. This gives (b). ¤
In light of Lemma 6, the convexity before TFL(q) owes to the increasing transition pdf
(»t(t;q; ^ q) ¸ 0) and the concavity after TFL(q) owes to the decreasing pdf (»t(t;q; ^ q) · 0).
6 The Demand for Information
A. The Demand Curve. We now consider linear pricing of information c(t) = ct,
where c is a strictly positive constant. Let demand ¿(c;q) maximize consumer surplus
¦(t;q) = u(t;q) ¡ ct = u(q) + v(t;q) ¡ ct: (18)
We hereafter ¯x q 6= ^ q, ignoring the cross-over belief ^ q, since it is a single point (i.e.
nongeneric); we can thus avoid hedging our theorems. Because of the non-concavity
near quantity 0, and since the marginal value ¯nitely peaks, there exists a choke-o® cost
cCH(q) > 0, above which demand is zero, and an implied minimum choke-o® demand,
TCH(q) > 0. At the cost cCH(q) > 0, demand is TCH(q) and consumer surplus is zero.
Thus, marginal value is falling, and so TCH(q) ¸ TFL(q), as in Figure 6. Summarizing:














Figure 7: Optimal and Approximate Large Demand. The true demand curve is depicted
in the left ¯gure. In the right ¯gure, true demand is the solid line and the approximation is the dotted
line. Parameter values: q = 0:2 or 0:8, ^ q = 0:5, ¼
A
H = 1, ¼
A
L = 2, ¼
B
H = 2, and ¼
B
L = 1.
Let us de¯ne TFOC(c;q) < TFL(q) by the FOC vt(TFOC(c;q);q) = c. This is well-
de¯ned i® c · vt(TFL(q);q), since vtt(TFL(q);q) < 0 on (TFL(q);1) (Theorem 3-(b)).
Demand is captured by the FOC precisely when the cost falls below the choke-o® cost.
Theorem 4 (Demand) ¿(c;q) = 0 if c > cCH(q) and ¿(c;q) = TFOC(c;q) if c · cCH(q).
Proof: Observe that by (18), ¦(t;q) =
R t
0[vt(s;q) ¡ c]ds. The integrand is ¯rst negative,
since vt(0+;q) = 0, and eventually negative, since vt(1;q) = 0. If c > cCH(q), then
the integral (consumer surplus) is always negative, and so the optimal demand is t = 0.
Otherwise, if c · cCH(q) < vt(TFL(q);q), then TFOC(c;q) exists, and by Theorem 3, the
integrand is positive for an interior interval ending at TFOC(c;q), where vt(TFOC(c;q);q)¡
c = 0. Thus, the integral is maximized at t = TFL(q), as needed. ¤
Corollary 2 (Law of Demand) Demand is falling in the price c, for c < cCH(q).
Indeed, simply apply vtt(t;q) < 0 for all t > TFL(q) (true by Theorem 3). Notice that
the law of demand applies to information too, but only after the price drops below the
choke-o® level cCH(q), so that positive demand is warranted. Figure 7 illustrates these
results: the jump in information demand as costs drop, as well as the Law of Demand.
B. Quantifying the Lumpiness. We now wish to explore the size of the nonconcavity
in the demand for information. The most direct approach here is to quantify the minimum
expenditure Tvt(T;q) on information that the DM must incur. Of course, this amount
16should increase in the maximum payo® stakes, simply because the marginal value of in-
formation does, by Lemma 2. Additionally, if beliefs are near 0 or 1, then information
demand vanishes. Seeking an appropriate normalization, let the expected payo® stakes
denote the maximum expected payo® loss from choosing a wrong action. We evaluate
these using the worst case scenario, which occurs at the cross-over belief q = ^ q:




B] = ^ q(1¡^ q)(M¡m)
This clearly vanishes when ^ q = 0;1, and increases in the maximum payo® stakes M ¡ m.
Theorem 5 (Least Positive Information Costs) The average lower bound on infor-




^ q(1 ¡ ^ q)(M ¡ m)
dr > 0:025: (20)
Proof: Suppressing the arguments of L = L(^ q;q) and TCH(q), we have
v(TCH;q)


























Using this equation, a lower bound on (20) is 0.025, as we show in the appendix. ¤
One reason why we take an average here is that the threshold choke-o® cost cCH(q)
vanishes as beliefs q approach ^ q or the extremes 0;1. Thus, the minimum information
purchase likewise vanishes nearing those three beliefs, and only an average makes sense.
C. Demand as a Function of Beliefs. A classic question asked of Bayesian sequential
learning models is the range of beliefs with a positive experimentation level.


















c and v (¿(c; ¹ q(c))) = ¿ (c; ¹ q(c))c: (21)
Furthermore, the choke-o® demands are TCH(¹ q(c)) = ¿(c; ¹ q(c)) and TCH(q(c)) = ¿(c;q(c)).
17Proof: First of all, demand is clearly positive at belief ^ q, since vt(0+; ^ q) = 1, by (b)
in Corollary 1. Further, demand vanishes at q = 0;1, since vt(t;0) = ut(t;0) = 0 and
vt(t;1) = ut(t;1) = 0 for all t. Thus, any interval structure obeys 0 < q(c) < ^ q < ¹ q(c) < 1.
Next, when positive, demand must satisfy the FOC vt(¿(q);q) = c. Thus, it su±ces
to prove that vt(t;q) is strictly quasi-concave in q, but this fails. Instead, we show local
quasi-concavity at the optimal demand ¿(c;q), since vt(t;q) is continuous. Speci¯cally, we
show that vtq(¿(c;q);q) = 0 implies vtqq(¿(c;q);q) < 0.












because our premise vtq(¿(c;q);q) = 0 is clearly equivalent to ¿q(c;q) = 0, by the FOC.
By Theorem 3-(b), we have vtt(¿(c;q);q) < 0, and so vtqq(¿(c;q);q) and ¿qq(c;q) share the
same sign. Since utt(¿(c;q);q) = 1










q2(1 ¡ q)2 < 0: (23)
Finally, demand vanishes when the DM is indi®erent between buying and not buying at
all | namely, at the choke-o® level. So (21) follows, and TCH(q) is as described. ¤
These results strikingly di®er from their analogues in a dynamic setting. That in-
formation demand is positive precisely on an interior interval is completely in harmony
with the standard sequential experimentation result (see MS1). However, it holds for an
entirely unrelated reason! In sequential experimentation, the DM stops when his Bellman
equation indicates that marginal costs and bene¯ts of further experimentation balance.
In our static demand setting, the DM buys no information when total costs and bene-
¯ts of any information purchase balance. Namely, given the nonconcavity in the value of
information, this demand choke-o® decision turns on considerations of global optimality.
The following theorem gives the relationship between positive demand and beliefs.





Proof: By Theorem 6, ¿(c;q) > 0 and so ¿q(c;q) = 0 implies ¿qq(c;q) < 0 by (22){(23). ¤
18Again, a comparison with the dynamic case is instructive, and here it is a contrast
in the result, and not just the rationale for the result. MS1 assume a convex cost of
information in a sequential experimentation model and deduce instead that information
demand is U-shaped and convex, and not hill-shaped and concave. The static demand
solution is the intuitive one, with demand greatest when the DM is most uncertain.
D. The Elasticity of Demand. The elasticity of the demand equals j¿c(c;q)c=¿(c;q)j.
When the elasticity equals 1, the demand level is TE(q), and revenue vt(t;q)t is maximized.








1 + L2(^ q;q)
i
= TFL(q) + 4: (24)
Like the peak marginal value TFL(q), the unit elastic demand does not depend on the
underlying payo® stakes, apart from the dependence on the cross-over belief ^ q. Further,
the marginal value is clearly falling at TE(q), since it exceeds TFL(q). A key question in
our setting is whether it lies above the choke-o® demand. The answer is yes, provided the
belief is su±ciently interior.
Theorem 8 (Elasticity)
(a) Demand is initially elastic for q 2 (¶ q; µ q), where 0 < ¶ q < ^ q < µ q < 1.
(b) Demand elasticity is decreasing in the cost c, for all c · cCH(q).
Observe that (¶ q; µ q) ½ (q(c); ¹ q(c)) because demand is positive for q 2 (¶ q; µ q). De¯ne cE(q) =
vt (TE(q);q), namely, the cost level where demand elasticity equals 1. Then cE(q) < cCH(q)
i® q 2 (¶ q; µ q). Rephrasing part (a), information demand is elastic for c 2 (cE(q);cCH(q)]
and inelastic if c < cE(q).
To make some sense of part (b), one can reason that the marginal value of information
drops o® so fast in the tail of the normal pdf that the demand elasticity falls monotonically.
E. Large Demand. We now give a simple asymptotically applicable demand formula.
It is consistent with the formula that MS2 derived for conditionally iid samples from any
signal distribution, using large deviation theory. Our work here, which follows from our
Gaussian framework, is more re¯ned, as we specify an additional error term,8 and show
8In the discrete signal world of MS2, their formula was eventually accurate within one signal.
19that it is positive | in other words, the limit demand curve is approached from above.
Theorem 9 (Low Prices) If c is small then the optimal demand is approximated by:




(1 + o(1)); (25)
where o(1) vanishes in c, and where F(q) = 1
2 log[q(1 ¡ q)^ q(1 ¡ ^ q)=64¼] + log(M ¡ m).
Observe that the approximate di®erence 2[log(¡log(c))]=log(c) between demand and
F(q) ¡ logc ¡ 1
2 log(¡logc) is negative, and asymptotically vanishing in c (see Figure 7).
Therefore, the three c-dependent terms of the demand function (25) provide (in order,
adding them from left to right) increasingly accurate approximations. As the cost of
information vanishes, demand is essentially logarithmic.
Proof of Theorem 9: First, if the cost c is small then TFOC(c;q) exists and u(TFOC(c;q);q) ¸
u(0;q). So in this case ¿(c;q) = TFOC(c;q). Second, from the FOC vt(¿(c;q);q) = c:
c =

















Taking logs, using the de¯nitions of L(^ q;q) and F(q) yields the log inverse demand curve:









¿(c;q) = F(q) ¡ Ã(¿(c;q)=8); (26)
where Ã(x) = x + 1
2 logx + B=x, for B = L2(^ q;q)=16. Notice that Ã¡1 exists when
Ã0(x) = 1 ¡ 1=(2x) ¡ B=x2 > 0, which is true for large x.9 Rearranging (26) produces
the demand curve ¿(c;q) = 8Ã¡1(F(q) ¡ logc). The appendix shows that Ã¡1(x) =
x¡ 1
2 logx+2[(logx)=x](1+o(1)) and that Ã¡1(x) > x¡ 1
2 logx. Thus, (25) follows from















Recall that we have normalized ³ = 1. Had we not done so, the demand function
in (25) would hold if divided by ³2. MS2 analyze the large demand for information as
9Speci¯cally, this holds for x > 1+
p
1 + L2(^ q;q)=16, which is less than TE(q). In other words, certainly
starting when demand is inelastic, our inverse demand curve ¿(c;q) = 8Ã
¡1(F(q) ¡ logc) is valid.
20the price c vanishes, for any arbitrary signal, not just for weak or gaussian signals as we
do here. They de¯ne a general information index for a signal, ½ 2 (0;1), where 0 means
perfectly informative, and 1 uninformative. They show that the demand function for small
c has the same logarithmic form as in (25), with same slope when we de¯ne ³2 = ¡8log(½):
¿(c;q)
8log(½)







In other words, the demand for any signal with information index ½ at small price is
approximately the same as the demand time with ³2 = ¡8log(½). Notice that ³ rises
from 0 to in¯nity as informativeness rises (½ falls from 1 to 0).
7 The Natural `Small Bits' of Information
7.1 Beliefs
Any theory of variable quantity information requires that it be measured in su±ciently
small units. While the paper assumed the di®usion process X(¢), we now observe that this
well-approximates a wide class of discrete choice models with `small bits' of information.
Assume the DM chooses the number n of i.i.d. draws from a signal, not necessarily
Gaussian. We show that as the informational content and the cost of each draw jointly
vanish, the associated value of information and the optimal sample size suitably converge
to their continuous time Brownian Motion counterparts.10 Therefore, our demand for
Gaussian information approximates the optimal number of cheap conventional signals.
Let fg(¢jµ;¢)g be a simple signal | a family of p.d.f.s, each indexed by the state
µ 2 fL;Hg, with support Z independent of µ. Further, assume that the signal becomes
uninformative as ¢ vanishes: lim¢#0 g(Zjµ;¢) = ¹ g(Z) > 0. Here, ¢ is the real time elapse
length of a time interval in discrete time. In the (continuous) time span [0;t], the DM
observes n = bt=¢c draws from g(¢jµ;¢) at times ¢;2¢;:::;n¢ : = t, where bac is the
largest integer smaller than a. As ¢ vanishes, the DM observes an exploding number of
increasingly uninformative conditionally i.i.d. signal realizations at very high frequency.
10Abreu, Milgrom, Pearce (1991) confront a related informational problem.
21Beliefs evolve according to Bayes rule:
q¢(n¢jZ) =
q¢((n ¡ 1)¢jZ)g(ZjH;¢)
q¢((n ¡ 1)¢jZ)g(ZjH;¢) + [1 ¡ q¢((n ¡ 1)¢jZ)]g(ZjL;¢)
: (27)
We want this Markov process to converge weakly to the di®usion (2) as ¢ vanishes and
n explodes.11 When this obtains, q¢(bt=¢c¢) and q(t) have nearly the same ¯nite-
dimensional distributions (suppressing Z arguments), as the next result asserts.
Theorem 10 (Small Bits) For every t > 0, the Markov process in (27) converges weakly









dz = ³2 (28)
Example. We propose one natural way to construct the required g (¢jµ;¢) from any
signal ff (¢jµ)g. Just garble f by supposing that in state µ the signal is drawn from f (¢jµ)
with chance 1=2+
p
¢, and from the other \incorrect" distribution with chance 1=2¡
p
¢.
For every ¢ > 0, this yields the required state-independent support Z. As ¢ vanishes,
the signal becomes pure noise, with state-independent limit ¹ g(Z) = [f(ZjH)+f(ZjL)]=2.







For example, if f(zjH) = 2z and f(zjL) = 2(1 ¡ z) for z 2 [0;1], then (29) implies
³2 = 4
R 1
0 (4z ¡ 2)2dz = 16
R 1
0 (2z ¡ 1)2dz = 16=3:
Thus, the relevant approximation is an arithmetic Wiener process with state-dependent
drift ¹ = §(2=
p
3)¾ for any di®usion coe±cient ¾.
11Convergence is in the sense of Skorokhod's topology on the space D([0;t];R) of right-continuous
functions with left limits.
227.2 Value and Demand Approximation
The ex ante value of a sample of n = bt=¢c conditionally i.i.d. draws from fg (¢jµ;¢)g is
v¢(t;q) ´ Eq[u(q¢(bt=¢c¢))] ¡ u(q);
where the expectation is taken w.r.t. the distribution of the discrete time belief process
q¢(bt=¢c¢). Since the latter converges weakly to q(t), and u(¢) is a continuous function:
lim
¢#0
¯ ¯v¢(t;q) ¡ v(t;q)
¯ ¯ = lim
¢#0
¯ ¯Eq[u(q¢(bt=¢c¢))] ¡ Eq[u(q(t))]
¯ ¯ = 0 (30)
for every prior q 2 [0;1]. The discrete time value function converges to the continuous
one. If we let v0(t;q) ´ v(t;q), then v¢(t;q) is continuous in ¢ at ¢ = 0 for every t ¸ 0:
Now consider the following decision problem. Fix ¢ > 0. The DM can purchase n
conditionally i.i.d. draws of Z, non-sequentially, at unit price c¢ and total outlays nc¢,




Note that ¦¢(0jc;q) = v(0;q) and v¢(n¢;q) · maxµ;a ¼µ
a for any ¢ > 0, so that
limn!1 ¦¢(n¢jc;q) = ¡1. It follows that a ¯nite non-negative maximum of ¦¢(n¢jc;q)
over integers n = 0;1;2;::: exists, and is attained by a correspondence N¢(c;q).
The analogous continuous time problem when observing X(t) with state-dependent
drift is supt¸0 ¦(tjc;q), where ¦(tjc;q) = v(t;q) ¡ ct. This problem yields the real-valued





v¢(t;q) ¡ ct = v0(t;q) ¡ ct = v(t;q) ¡ ct = ¦(tjc;q):
The maximized value in the discrete model is thus near that of the continuous time model.
Theorem 11 (Demand Convergence) There is a selection n¢(c;q) 2 N¢(c;q) such





¯ ¯n¢(c;q)¢ ¡ ¿(c;q)
¯ ¯ = 0:
23The proof is in the appendix.
















We have measured information in units that correspond to sample sizes of conditionally
iid signals, and assumed weak enough signals. In this setting, we have completely and
tractably characterized the demand for information for the two state world. We have, in
particular, provided the full picture of the famous informational nonconcavity for the ¯rst
time. Additionally, we have characterized the elasticity of information, the large demand
formula, and the dependence of demand on beliefs. Finally, we have shown that our model
well approximates all small bit models of information. Our theory extends, with additional
complexity, to a model with any ¯nite set of actions, since that merely adds to the number
of cross-over beliefs. The restriction to two states, instead, is real.
Kihlstrom (1974) succeeded with o®-the-shelf techniques precisely because of the self-
conjugate property of the normal, as well as the particular payo® function. Analysis of
the learning per se is bipassed entirely. But a learning model is generally useful insofar
as one knows how posterior beliefs evolve stochastically. Either a ¯nite action space or
state space invalidates this approach, and one must treat the learning problem seriously.
And indeed, many choices in life are inherently discrete, like whether to change jobs, have
a child, or build a prototype. In our two-state model, beliefs are not linear in signal
realizations, so that this solving for this density requires new solution methods. We show
that this problem is just like the option pricing exercise | only harder.
24A Omitted Proofs
A.1 Limit Beliefs: Proof of Lemma 1 (a)




y2(1¡y)2 < 1 for some " > 0. So Feller's









dq = 1 8 c 2 (0;1):
A.2 Value Function Derivation: Proof of Theorem 1





















































































































































t^ y(t;q) + 1
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25which is the pdf of a normal variable with mean
p















































































Using ©(y) = 1 ¡ ©(¡y), we get FIG(t;q); v(t;q) = u(t;q) ¡ u(q) then yields (12). ¤
A.3 Marginal Value: Proof of Theorem 2





































































































































where the second equality owes to Á(¡x) = Á(x) and Á
³p
t
















B) and ^ q = (¼L
A ¡ ¼L
B)=(M ¡ m).
Finally (14) yields (13) by taking further time derivatives and by using Lemma 5. ¤
A.4 Slopes at Zero: Proof of Corollary 1











26where A2(n¡1)(q);¢¢¢ ;A0(q) are bounded functions of q.







, each extra di®erentiation
produces, via the product rule, a polynomial in 1=t whose highest power rises by two. ¤









for all (t;q) 2 (0;1)£(0;1). The second, third, and fourth equalities owe to (7), (8), and
(14), by taking the limit t ! 1 or t # 0. [Indeed, limt#0 »(t;q; ^ q) = lims#0
e¡1
s p
s e¡s = 0 if






















This gives the ¯fth equality of Corollary 1. ¤
A.5 Information Lumpiness: Proof of Theorem 5
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8 q ¸ ^ q:
(33)
Equation (33) gives that v(TCH(q);q)=[^ q(1 ¡ ^ q)(M ¡ m)] exceeds
j(q; ^ q)=
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
q
q(1¡q)















8 ^ q ¸ q
q
q(1¡q)













8 q ¸ ^ q:
It can be shown that J(^ q) =
R 1
0 j(q; ^ q)dq is convex on (0;1), and is minimized at ^ q = 0:5.
We shall now bound this minimized value. Indeed, j(¢;0:5) is a double-hump shape: It is
concave on (0;0:5) and (0:5;1), and limq#0 j(q;0:5) = limq!0:5 j(q;0:5) = limq"1 j(q;0:5) =
0 because L(0:5;q) = 0 and TFL = 0 if ^ q = q = 0:5, while the limits at q = 0 and
q = 1 require l'Hopital's rule. Further, j(¢;0:5) satis¯es j(r;0:5) = j(1 ¡ r;0:5) where
0 < r < 0:5. Therefore, we can inscribe between the horizontal j = 0 axis and the
27j(q;0:5) curve two equally tall triangles, whose area is a lower bound on J(0:5), namely,
J(0:5) > (0:5)maxq2(0;0:5) j(q;0:5). Finally, maxq2(0;0:5) j(q;0:5) = j(0:25;0:5) > 0:05. ¤
A.6 Elasticity of Demand: Proof of Theorem 8
Proof of Part (a). Now we show that there exist two points where TE(q) = TCH(q) |
one when q < ^ q and one when q > ^ q. Let us de¯ne the gross surplus function ° as follows
°(q) ´ v(TE(q);q) ¡ vt(TE(q);q)TE(q): (34)
It su±ces to show that °(q) > 0 i® q 2 (¶ q; µ q), where ^ q 2 (¶ q; µ q). We will prove that °(q) > 0
for q 2 (¶ q; ^ q); the case (^ q; µ q) follows from symmetry. Di®erentiating (7) yields:



















Claim 3 We have °(0+) = 0, °q(0+) = ¡1, and °(^ q) > 0.





= 1, we get
limq#0 TE(q) = limq#0 L2(^ q;q) = 1 and using (7) and (14), we get
lim
q#0













































TE(q) = 1. Thus, limq#0 °(q) = 0.
28Next we solve limr#0 °q(r), where
°q(q) = vq(TE(q);q) ¡ vtt(TE(q);q)TE(q) @
@qTE(q) ¡ vtq(TE(q);q)TE(q): (36)
Let us analyze the di®erent terms separately. By Theorem 3, we have vtt(TE(q);q) < 0.
Di®erentiating (24) gives
@






@qTE(r) = ¡1: Because limq#0 TE(q) = 1, the second term in (36) satis¯es
limq#0 vtt(TE(q);q)TE(q) @















TE(q) = 0. Since vq(TE;q) is bounded, we get °q(0+) = ¡1.
Finally, we calculate the value of °(^ q) by using (34). We again divide the expression
into di®erent parts. Because L(^ q; ^ q) = 0, we have TE(^ q) = 4, and so from (14), we get




Since TE(^ q) = 4, equation (12) gives









By subtracting (37) from (38), we get °(^ q) > 0, since
R 1
¡1 e¡ x2
2 dx > e¡1=2. ¤
Claim 4 °(¢) : (0; ^ q) ! R is convex.
Proof: Twice di®erentiating (34) gives
¡°qq(q) = vttt(TE(q);q)TE(q)( @
@qTE(q))2 + 2vttq(TE(q);q)TE(q) @
@qTE(q) + vtt(TE(q);q)( @
@qTE(q))2
+vtt(TE(q);q)TE(q) @2
@q2TE(q) + vtqq(TE(q);q)TE(q) ¡ vqq(TE;q):





















vtqq(t;q)=vtt(t;q) = vqq(t;q)=vt(t;q) = 2
q2(1¡q)2





L4 + 4L2(2 + S) + 8(1 + S)
¢




where S = 1 +
p
1 + L2. ¤
From Claim 3 we get °(^ q) > 0 and °(") < 0 for " > 0. Since °(¢) is continuous, there
exists ¶ q 2 (0; ^ q) such that °(¶ q) = 0. The uniqueness follows from Claim 4. Hence, °(q) > 0
for q 2 (¶ q; ^ q). The proof for the existence and uniqueness of µ q 2 (^ q;1) is symmetric. ¤
Proof of Part (b). Note that when c · cCH(q) then ¿(c;q) > 0. Let us denote elasticity
E(c) = ¡c¿c(c;q)=¿(c;q). Clearly, E0(c) > 0 i®
c¿2
c (c;q) ¡ [¿c(c;q) + ¿cc(c;q)c]¿(c;q) > 0: (39)
Di®erentiating vt(¿(c;q);q) = c yields ¿c(c;q) = 1=vtt and ¿cc(c;q) = ¡vttt(¿;q)=v3
tt(¿;q).
Hence, if we substitute from (16) and (17) for vtt=vt and vttt=vtt, we get
c¿2


























































which is positive because vtt(¿;q) < 0 when ¿(c;q) > TCH(q). Hence, E(c) is rising in the
cost c, and thus falling in the quantity ¿. ¤
30A.7 Large Demand: Inverting the Inverse Demand Curve in Theorem 9
Claim 5 Assume that "(x) > 0 is an increasing C1 function of x, with "(x)=x ! 0, and
"0(x) = &=x+O(1=x2). Then the map Ã(x) = x+"(x) has inverse ¯(x) = x¡±(x) where
±(x) = "(x)(1 ¡ &=x + O(1=x2)). Furthermore, ±(x) > "(x) for all x.
Simply notice that "(x) = 1
2 logx + B=x obeys the required conditions with & = 1=2.
Proof of Claim: Let ¯(x) = x ¡ ±(x), for ±(x) > 0 | whose sign is clear, because ¯
and Ã are re°ections of each other about the diagonal. Also, since Ã(x) ! 1, so must
¯(x) ! 1, by re°ection. By the inverse property, Ã(x¡±(x)) ´ x¡±(x)+"(x¡±(x)) ´ x.
Since x 7! "(x) is increasing, ±(x) = "(x ¡ ±(x)) < "(x).
Taking a ¯rst order Taylor series of " about x yields ±(x) = "(x)¡±(x)"0(^ x) < "(x) for
some intermediate value ^ x 2 [x ¡ ±(x);x]. Hence, ^ x=x ¸ 1 ¡ ±(x)=x ¸ 1 ¡ "(x)=x ! 1.
±(x) =
"(x)





1 + "0(^ x)
¶
= "(x)(1¡&=^ x+O(1=^ x2)) = "(x)(1¡&=^ x+O(1=x2))
A.8 Convergent Belief Processes: Proof of Theorem 10
By Durrett (1996, Theorem 8.7.1), three conditions must be met for weak convergence:
The discrete belief process has sample paths that are continuous in the limit with proba-
bility one, and the ¯rst two moments of the changes in the discrete time process converge
to those of the continuous time process. We now verify these in succession:











¯ q¢((n ¡ 1)¢) = q
¢
= 0:
This follows from the continuity of Bayes rule (27) in the likelihoods g(Zjµ): As the signal
becomes non-informative, beliefs move less and less, so that the above probability equals
P
µ
q(1 ¡ q)jg(ZjH;¢) ¡ g(ZjL;¢)j
qg(ZjH;¢) + (1 ¡ q)g(ZjL;¢)
¸ "
¶
which vanishes with ¢ for every Z 2 Z as jg(ZjH;¢) ¡ g(ZjL;¢)j ! 0.

















¯ ¯ = 0
which holds because the terms vanish due to the martingale property of beliefs.

















¯ ¯ = 0:
By the martingale property, we replace the variance with the expected squared increment:
V
£








q2(1 ¡ q)2[g(ZjH;¢) ¡ g(ZjL;¢)]2
qg(ZjH;¢) + (1 ¡ q)g(ZjL;¢)
dZ:
Using (28), the limit as ¢ # 0 equals q2(1 ¡ q)2 = V[dq(t)jq(t) = q]=dt for all q 2 [0;1],
after the time normalization ³ = 1.
A.9 Approximate Value Functions: Proof of Theorem 11
For every y ¸ 0, let
­¢(y¢jc) ´ ¦¢ (by + 1c¢jc)[1 ¡ (y ¡ byc)]
1
¢ + ¦¢ (byc¢jc)(y ¡ byc)
1
¢ :
Since (y ¡ byc)
1
¢ 2 [0;1], this a weighted average of the maximand ¦¢(y¢jc) of program
(31) at the two adjacent integers to y. Also, ­¢(y¢jc) is continuous in y ¸ 0 (continuity at
integer values of y can be veri¯ed directly), in c ¸ 0, and in ¢ > 0. The latter holds because
cbyc¢ is clearly continuous in ¢, and v¢ (byc¢) =
R
u(g(x))fXbyc (xj¢)dx is continuous in
¢ for given sample size byc from previous results. Thus, ¦¢ (byc¢jc) = v¢ (byc¢)¡cbyc¢
is continuous in ¢, and ­¢(y¢jc) inherits this property.
Next, ­¢ (byc¢jc) = ¦¢ (byc¢jc), i.e. ­¢(y¢jc) is de¯ned over a real-valued y
but coincides with the discrete maximand at integer values of y (at multiples of ¢).
Also, ­¢(y¢jc) is a weighted average of ¦¢ (byc¢jc) and ¦¢ (by + 1c¢jc), and so of
­¢ (byc¢jc) and ­¢ (by + 1c¢jc). Then ­¢(y¢jc) · max
­
­¢ (byc¢jc);­¢ (by + 1c¢jc)
®
32with strict inequality if and only if: y is not an integer and ¦¢ (by + 1c¢jc) 6= ¦¢ (byc¢jc).
Since we can always improve weakly over any y by choosing either byc or by+1c, it follows
that the correspondence M¢(c) ´ argmaxy¸0 ­¢(y¢jc) always contains a non-negative






Finally, 0 · y ¡ byc · 1, and so (y ¡ byc)
1
¢ is a positive function of ¢ that vanishes with





v¢(t) ¡ ct = v0(t) ¡ ct = ¦(tjc):
We are now ready to use the auxiliary problem of maximizing ­¢(y¢jc) over y ¸ 0.
Again, ­¢ (0jc) = 0 and limy!1 v¢(byc¢) · maxµ;a ¼µ
a < 1. We can thus restrict the
choice of y to a compact interval [0; ¹ y(¢)], where ¹ y(¢) is the continuous function de¯ned
by the largest solution m to v¢ (m¢) = cm¢. Therefore, we can rewrite
M¢(c) = arg max
y2[0;¹ y(¢)]
­¢(y¢jc):
We conclude that y maximizes a function ­¢(y¢jc) continuous in y;c;¢ over a
compact-valued and continuous correspondence [0; ¹ y(¢)]. Notice that by de¯nition of
­¢, a non-integer y belongs to M¢(c) i® both byc and by + 1c do. This is a non-generic
event (w.r.t. Lebesgue measure over the space of c > 0); generically, either there exists
one (integer) maximizer in M¢(c), or the maximizers are non-consecutive integers, so that
M¢(c) contains only integers a.e. in parameter space. Since ­¢ maximized at an integer





­¢ (byc¢jc) = max
n=0;1;2;:::
¦¢(n¢jc)
we conclude that M¢(c) = N¢(c) a.e. in parameter space. The ¯rst maximization above




33the maximization over a compact-valued and continuous correspondence [0; ¹ y(¢)¢] of a
function ­¢(tjc) which is continuous in t;c;¢. This maximization yields a correspondence
T¢(c) = M¢(c)=¢ (with a slight abuse of notation).
By Berge's Theorem of the Maximum, the correspondence of maximizers T¢(c) is
u.h.c. in ¢ and c. Hence, as ¢ # 0, some selection ¿¢(c;q) 2 T¢(c) converges to the
unique maximizer ¿(c;q) of the continuous time problem ¦(tjc) = lim¢#0 ­¢(tjc): namely,
lim¢#0
¯ ¯¿¢(c;q) ¡ ¿(c;q)
¯ ¯ = 0 a.e. in parameter space. Let y¢(c) ´ ¿¢(c;q)=¢ 2 M¢(c).
This selection must be integer-valued and a maximizer of ¦¢(n¢jc) a.e. in parameter
space. Thus, y¢(c) = n¢(c) for some n¢(c) 2 N¢(c;q). Hence, for some choice n¢(c) =
¿¢(c;q)=¢ 2 N¢(c;q) among the optimal discrete sample sizes, a.e. in parameter space,
0 = lim
¢#0
¯ ¯¿¢(c) ¡ ¿(c;q)
¯ ¯ = lim
¢#0
¯ ¯y¢(c)¢ ¡ ¿(c;q)
¯ ¯ = lim
¢#0
¯ ¯n¢(c)¢ ¡ ¿(c;q)
¯ ¯: ¤
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